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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
~DEAN

HALES and VALDA HALES,
Appellants & Plaintiffs,
-vs-

VANCE PETERSON and MARGERY
PETERSON, d.b.a. Valley Builders
Supply Company, and
PAUL CALDWELL,
Respondents & Defendants.

rCASE
9294
I

No.

I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This law suit was commenced to recove-r damages for
the wrongful death of Nila Hales, a nine year old daughter of Dean Hales and Valda Hales, caused in an accident
which took place on October 24, 1958, at approximately
8:45 a.m., immediately in front of the Elementary School
in Redmond, Sevier County, Utah. At the time of the accident, Nila Hales was on her way to school where she was
enrolled as a student in the fourth grade. Her mother,
Valda Hales, who taught at the school, had driven them
in her car from the adjoining town of Salina, where they
lived. There is a street in front of the school and to the
south, which street runs in an east-west direction. The
school house sits back in from the street approximately
58 ft. 5 inches. (Exhibit Pl. no. 9). Playgrounds are to the
east and west of the schoolhouse. On the morning of the
accident, Mrs. Hales parked her car, as usual on the south
side of the street in front -of the school. It was behind and
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to the west of Principal Roger Nielson's pickup truck.
The vehicles were approximately two feet apart and within about six to eight inches from the curb (R 156). After
parking in front of the school house and across the street,
Mrs. Hales went directly to the school house, and Nila
took some eggs and pop bottles to an adjoining store about
three to four buildings east from where the car was parked
and on the same side of the street, to exchange for some
candy and Halloween treats.
Two witnesses, David Weldon and Gerald Christensen, both students at the school, testified that they observed her bring her purchase from the store, put some of
it in the car, and then pass in front of her mother's car
and behind the principal's car into the streeet on her way
to the school house (R 128-174). Some of the evidence as to
what happeened after this differs in some respects. But at
the same tin1e the evidence is uncontradicted that Defendant, Paul Caldwell, an employe of Vance PeteTson and
Margery Peterson, d.b.a. Valley Builders Supply Company
of Gunnison, Utah, was driving a heavily laden gravel
truck with approximately six tons of gravel loaded on a
steel bed with side boards approximately four feet high
and open at the back end, down the street in an easterly
direction, passing immediately in front of the elementary
school grounds. Paul Caldwell, the driver, testified that
he was traveling 15 to 20 miles per hour, reaching a maximum speed of what he estimated to be 20 miles per hour
(R 145). He stated that he was continually picking up
speed as he passed in front of the school house (R 148) and
that he was at his maximum speed when he felt a bump,
as though th truck had run over something in front of the
school. He didn't ren1ember of any chuck holes; so he
stopped his truck and got out and walked back to find
that he had run over and killed Nila Hales. When ques-
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tioned about the accident by City Marshal, Carl Anderson, who was the first officer to arrive at the scene, Mr.
Anderson testified of their conversation as follows:
A. "Where I talked to Mr. Caldwell was right by
the back of his truck and that was the only time I
talked to him and asked him about his driver's
license and he took them out and showed them to
me and I -vvrote down a little notation is all. And
he said that he did not see the child, but he -vvas
watching the school children on the north side of
the street." (R 201)
No measurements or pictures were taken, or other
inquiries made until after the body was removed by the
Peterson Mortuary and the truck moved, except that Marshal Anderson stepped the distance from the body to the
place where the truck stopped diagonally in the road with
the front wheels north and left of the center and the back
vvheels south of the center of the road at about a 20 degree
angle, -vvhich was 30 to 35 ft. from the body. (R 201).
Thereafter, the truck and the body were moved. (R 201)
The testimony -vvi th regard to the position of the body
on the street was about the same from all witnesses. Warren Richard Jensen, the licensed funeral director who
moved the body, stated that it was practically parallel
vvith the road, and reasonably close to the center. (R 1G).
Mrs. Hales testified that the body was lying parallel -vvi th
the road with the child's head to the east and her feet to
the west, and with her stomach and right side of her face
to the oiled surface road. He left leg was extended out
to the left of her trunk and had not been injured or
scuffed as much as the right side of the body. One shoe
\vas n1issing. (R 102). Dr. Ray E. Noys, who examined the
body, testified that the head was crushed and the brain
tissue coming out of the right side, that there were abraSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sions and scuffs principally along the right side of the
body and the right leg, that there was a six to eight inch
laceration along the the abdominal cavity at the right
groin and that the pelvic bone was crushed. The doctor
further testified that the child's head had been run over,
and the leg and midsection run over,that the head would
not be crushed like it was from results of a fall, and that
there was great pressure to cause the laceration of the
groin (R. 12). In answer to a prolonged cross examination
by defendant counsel, the doctor testified as follows:
Q. "and so in your opinion it (the truck) went

over her right leg and right groin and threw her
to the ground and she fractured her skull; is that
right?"
A. "I would hardly think that the force throwing her to the ground would fracture her skull to
the degree it was. I think she either had to be run
over or else the truck had to hit her some place
that would come as a great force, but I don't think
falling to the ground would ever do that much.
Q. "But being thro-vvn to the ground would do

that much, would it not?"
A. "Not that. If they were traveling fifteen miles
I don't think it would produce that severe-! don't
think its possible."
Q. "Then your opinion is that it (truck) ran over

her leg, groin and her head?
A. "I would feel that in some n1anner it had ...
it had done that." (R. 13)
The testimony of David Weldon, an eye witness, was
that the child was hit near the center of the road after
she had hollered "help, help," by tbe front bumper of
the truck near the right front ferider and was knocked
forward and the right front wheel passed over her body
(R 128-129). The defendant, Paul Caldwell, the driver,
testified that the right rear wheel passed over her body

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

(n

14G). The testimony of these three witnesses establish

that the wheel or wheels on the right side of the truck
passed over the body with the right front crushing the
head and the rear dual wheels crushing the pelvic and
injuring the right leg.
As the an1bulance was leaving with the body, the
road patrolman arrived from Salina and subsequently
the sheriff and deputy sheriff arrived from Richfield.
1\,leasurements were taken by them of some blood spots in
the road, the first one approximately two feet in diameter
at the spot where the witnesses said the child's body lay,
(R 110) and anotheT spot about a foot in length and three
or four inches in -vvidth further east, approximately 4 or 5
feet toward where the truck stopped. The center of the
first blood spot was measured to be 18 ft. 5 in. from the
south curb. (R 79). It was directly North of the alley which
-vvould be just east of the front end of the principal's car.
This is about the same distance the child was seen knocked
from the position where she had walked near the center
of the road, a point about 18 feet 5 inches north from the
curb in front of her mother's car. The city officer, Mr.
Anderson, testified that following the accident he was
able to see the tire tread left in the road after it had passed
over the child's body on toward the east where the truck
had come to a stop approximately 30 to 35 ft. away
(R 207). The truck driver, Paul Caldwell, in describing
the course of his truck up to the point of the accident drew
a line on the map or diagram (Exhibit Pl-9) indicating that
the right wheels of his truck passed over the blood spot
\vhere the child had lain, (R-145). The road through this
area \\'"as straight and -vvithout any appreciable grade.
There were no vehicles parked behind the Hales car and
because of the alley and the utility pole, there was no place
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

for parking west on the south side of the street up to the
post office some 50 ft. away. (Exhibit Pl-9) (F 107). The
width of the principal's truck was 82 inches, the Hales
car was 70 inches wide. (R 156)
The uncontroverted evidence of the case is that the
decedent reached a position on the road in front of the
school house after crossing from the south curb toward
the north when she was hit by the truck and run over at
least 18 ft. 5 in. into the road. The only controversy in
the evidence is as to whether the fran t end of the truck
struck the child first or whether the child was struck by
some portion of the truck behind the front bumper. Even
though it appears definite that the child was hit by the
front of the vehicle and knocked forward parallel with the
road and the right wheels passed over her body, the plaintiff's case is still affected very little if at all by defendant's
contention that the child was hit by the truck at a point
behind the front bumper.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this appeal, Plaintiff contends:
1. The trial court erred in not granting plaintiffs a
directed verdict as requested by the plaintiff, and further
erred in not granting a motion for new trial or judgment
notwithstanding verdict for the overwhelming evidence
in support of plaintiffs and the cumulative errors prejudicing the plaintiffs' case.
2. The trial court committed error in refusing to admit
evidence submitted by the Plaintiff as to the length of time
it took each of 14 girls of the same age, size and years of
experience in school as Nila Hales, the decedent, to walk
normally, walk fast as they could, and run as fast as they
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could for a distance of 100 ft.; which evidence of time elenlent was to be used by an expert physicist to determine
the distance the truck traveling at either 15 or 20 miles
per hour, would have traveled while the girl traveled from
the north side of her mother's car at the south curb to the
point of impact, 18 ft. 5 in. from the south curb, or 11 ft.
G in. from the north side of her mother's car. Other important physical facts were deductible from such evidence.
3. The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury as requested by the plaintiff as
to presumption of due care of the decedent immediately
prior to her death as contained in Instruction No. 14, as
follows:
"You are instructed that based upon the commonly kno\vn fact that the instinct for self-preservation is such that persons use ordinary and reasonable care for their own safety. The law permits
you to asume that Nila Hales, at the time of and
immediately preceeding the incident in question,
-vvas exercising due care for her own safety. And
you may make findings in accordance therewith
unless you are persuaded from a preponderance of
the evidence that she was guilty of contributory
negligence, as elsewhere in these instructions defined."
4. That the trial Court committed error in instructing
the jury t\vice, Instruction 8 and Instruction 13, on negligence, proxin1ate cause and contributory negligence and
telling the jury twice, that the plaintiff may not recover
unless you find from a preponderance of the evidence ( 1)
Cald-vvell was negligent, (2) his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury and (3) there was no negligence
on the part of Nila Hales that contributed to her own injury, \\~herein the plaintiff was given a double burden of
overcon1ing t\vo instructions on contributory negligence
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and where plaintiff should have had the more favorable
position of an instruction on presumption of due care.
5. That the court committed error in giving in this
case an instruction on unavoidable accident, Instruction
No. 11. It was an incorrect statement of the law when considered with the other instructions. It further denied the
decedent her presumption of the right of due care for her
own safety, reemphasized contributory negligence and
confused the jury.
6. Counsel for Defendants was guilty of misconduct
justifying reversible error and the trial court committed
error in not granting plaintiff motion for a new trial when
in his argument to the jury defense counsel stated:
"That the investigating enforcement officers had
not given any citation to the defendant driver for
misconduct and accordingly they had found the
driver not negligent.''
7. The court committed error in not instructing the
jury as to the law governing the conduct of a driver in
front of a school house where children of a tender age are
going to school and playing, and that such driver is not
permitted to drive 20 miles per hour with a 6 ton load of
gravel because a posted speed sign indicates 20 miles per
hour, as t;Ontained in Plaintiff's proposed instructions 8,
9, and 10.
ARGUMENT
I

ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN NOT GRANTING
PLAINTIF'FS A DIRECTED VERDICT AS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIF'F, AND IN NOT GRANTING MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL OR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTAND-
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ING VERDICT BASED ON OVERWHELlVIING EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE PLAINTIFF, AND FOR
CUMULATIVE ERRORS PREJUDICING PLAINTIFF'S
CASE.
The trial court erred in not granting the plaintiff a
directed verdict as requested by the plaintiff, and further
erred in not granting a motion for a new trial, or judgn1ent notwithstanding verdict, based on the Uncontradicted evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Defendant and Respondent herein. Had it not been for the
confusion of the Jury caused by improper instructions and
the lack of nstruction requested, the decision would have
followed the almost universal holding in such cases. The
instant case when viewed most favorably from all positions
in favor of the defendant and respondent herein, is almost
identical to the case of Cotant vs. United States 103 Federal Supplement 770, a recent Idaho case, which case was a
wrongful death case of a minor child approximately the
same age as the decedent Nila Hales. In the Cotant case,
the minor was not at school grounds but was in a residential section of town. The driver of the vehicle was driving
a mail truck and testified that he was well acquainted with
the neighborhood, having driven along this street for about
a year. On the day in question, there was one car parked
on the curb on the right side of the driver. It was at the
point of this car that the boy came out and into contact
\vith the mail truck. The driver said he didn't see the boy,
that he was looking down the street to determine where
the other mail carrier was. The appellate court in ruling
on the matter of negligence said:
"In the operation of this mail truck with the
kno-vvledge he had from a year's experience in driving this street, Noble, the driver, was duty bound
to exercise reasonable care for the safety of the
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children of this residential district as he would
have had, had he been driving by a school house."
"The driver was chargeable with seeing the children both in front of him and to the left and right."
This same rule is pronounced in the case of Bennett
vs. Deaton, 58 Pacific 2nd, 895. The U. S. Appellate Court
further quoted Bejington vs. Horton, 102 Pacific 2nd. 652,
and Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Blashfield, 2 A Sec. 1491, as follows:
''Of all the cases of destruction of lives and
homes that have followed the wake of the motor
vehicle; that of mangling of the children beneath
its wheels carries the most poignant sense of tragedy. This is partly due to the contrast between
their innocence and helplessness on the one hand
and the ponderousness of the machine that crushes
them into the earth on the other. The safeguarding
of the child has always appealed to the protective
instincts of man, whether civilized or savage, and
the humanitarian driver of an automobile, when
the time and place is such that the presence of
children in the neighborhood and therefore their
excursions into the streets may reasonably be expected, will have his machine under such control
that it can be stopped almost instantly."
"Courts have said that careful and competent
drivers do not have accidents. While this statement
of course is not intended to be taken in its exact
literal import, there is some element of truth in
it, and it ought certainly to be made true where
children are concerned."
Even though in the Cotant case the child ran from
behind a parked vehicle, and even though the child was
struck by his contact with the side of the mail truck, and
even though it was in a residential district, the Court commented that the care of the driver spould be as careful as
in front of a school house (the instant case) all such factors less favorable to Plaintiff than in the instant case the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11

lf. S. Appellate Court stated,
"without further detailing the evidence, the
Court, in taking the evidence as a whole, is satisfied that the driver of the Governn1ent Mail truck
was clearly guilty of negligence."

Another case almost identical, but which also is not
as strong as the instant case, even when viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant and respondent herein, is the case of Sweitzer vs Anderson 83 NW 2nd. 416.
This is an accident where a child is returning from school,
and though the child was three blocks from the school,
the motorist passed the school house prior to the accident,
and had seen the children who had just been dismissed.
The child who was run into and injured by the motorist ran
from the side of the street into the road. The Court held
that the maintenance of a reasonable lookout by the defend-.
ant included watching the sides of the street for children
who might reasonably be expected to be there on their
vvay home from school, as well as the center of the street,
and that the defendant, therefore should have seen the
plaintiff, Michael, both before and after he had started
running toward the street and that if she had so seen him,
she could with reasonable care have avoided the accident.
The Court stated in its decision as follows:
"When children may be expected along a street,
a motorist may not limit his view to a roadway
ahead of him, but has a duty to watch the sides
of the street as well."
The Appellate Court in this case reversed the trial court
and ordered a new trial.
It is contended that there is no place in the world
vv here small children are entitled to greater protection,
greater care, and where more vigilance for their safety
should be exercised than at the school grounds. If any
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court, by its decree, permits a driver, especially of a heavy
laden truck, to pass immediately in front of an elementary
school house just before school takes up, where the driver
continues to increase his speed to twenty miles an hour
watching children on the playground without ever seeing
a child who has crossed 18V2 ft, into the street on her way
to the school house, and holds that the same does not constitute negligence of the driver, after he runs her down
and crushes the child into the earth, the court would thereby countenance like conduct of other drivers, and school
would not be an adequately safe place for parents to send
their children.

II.
ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL FACTS RELATING TO
LENGTH OF TIME IT TOOK EACH OF 14 GIRLS
SAME AGE, SIZE AND EXPERIENCE AS DECEDENT
TO WALK, OR RUN DISTANCE OF 100FT.
The trial Court committed error in refusing to admit
evidence submitted by the Plaintiff as to the length of time
it took each of 14 girls, who were each of about the same
~-ge, size and years of experience in school as was N ila
Hales, the decedent, to walk normally, walk fast as they
could, and run fast as they could, a distance of 100 feet;
which evidence was to be used by an expert physicist to
determine the distance the truck traveling at either 15 or
20 miles per hour traveled, while the girl traveled from
the north edge of the mother's car to the point of in1pact,
18 feet 5 inches from the south curb or 11 feet 6 inches
from the north side of the mother's car, and how long the
driver was inattentive as to what was the11e to be seen.
In establishing the negligence of the defendant truck
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driver, probably no fact siooa out more important than
that he drove a big loaded gravel truck with six tons of
gravel past an elementary school house at 8:45 a.m. in the
morning just before school started, and while the students
were coining to school, driving at a speed of from 15 to 20
tniles per hour without ever seeing the child who was
erasing the street in front of him. This is according to his
O\vn testimony. ( R 201). It took a certain length of time for
the child to get into the street where she had contact with
the truck. The truck driver drew a line on the diagram
(Exhibit Pl. 9) as to his course of travel and testified that
the right wheels of the truck he was driving went right
over the area where the spot of blood was measured to be
18ft. 5 inches from the south curb. Allowing the defendant
driver the benefit of every doubt and supposing that the
child became visible at the north edge of the mother's car
(and even a casual observation would have seen her before that) she still traveled 11 ft. 6 inches before impact
with the truck, the mother having testified that her car
\vas 70 inches wide and parked -vvithin 6 inches of the
curb. (R 156). For the purpose of this argument, it doesn't
matter too much which part of the truck struck the child,
and the evidence is just as important and vital if the child
were \valking normally, walking fast, or running fast,
plaintiff 'vas prepared to show how long it took her to get
to the path of the vehicle, and how far the vehicle traveled
after she came into view, regardless of whether she \vas
\valking normally, walking fast, or running fast. David
\Veldon stated that while he was sitting in the swing he
\vatched her walk to a position near the center of the road,
then holler "help, help!" on observing the truck, and that
she was then hit with the front bumper, knocked out in
front of the truck and then run over with the right front
\Vheel (R 129). After intensive cross examination by deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fendant's couns~l as to the distance away the truck was
at various times, the testimony remained final and the
same. The testimony of the witness is as follows, as given
on recross examination by defendant counsel:
''Q. Now did you think Nila was walking?

A. Yes.
Q. And in which direction do you think she was

walking?
A. She was walking from the opera house to the
school house.
Q. And you think that she was walking from
near the opera house to the school house and you
think she was in the middle of the street?

A. Yes.
Q. And at that time the truck was down by the
post office?.

A. Yes.
Q. And

you
til she was hit?

think

that

she

was

walking

A. Yes.
Q. Now why do you say you think? Why do you

use the words, "you think" (argument of counsel)
Q. Why do you say you think, son?

A. Well, I am not positive that it is.
Q. You are not what?

A. Positive of the truth.
Q. I see.

Mr. Eliason; Of what? Of how far the truck was,
or what?
Mr. Hanson: Let's let the little boy explain what
he means. What do you mean you are not positive
as to the truth?
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A. Well, I can't exactly tell you how far the
truck was.
Q. Is there anything else you are not positive

about, son?
A. No.
Q. You can't exactly tell us how far down the

street the truck was?
A. No.
Q. vVhy do you say you think the little girl was

crossing the street?
A. Well, I am positive she was walking, I'm positive of that.
If the measurements made by Mr. Nielson, the principal, had been permitted it could have been explained to
the jury that the average speed that girls of this age and
size walk is 4.4 ft. per second; that the fastest that any of
these girls could run was a speed equivalent to 9 miles
per hour. It could then further have been testified to the
jury from simple mathematical deductions, that while the
child vvalked 11 ft. the truck going 15 miles per hour traveled 55 ft., and the truck if traveling 20 miles per hour
traveled during that same time, a distance of 73 ft. That
if the child had been running as fast as the fastest of any
of the 14 girls her age could run the full distance to the
point of impact, the truck would have traveled 17 ft. even
at 15 1\LP.H. during such time. That in allowing .3 of a
second as reaction time, the truck driver should be able
to stop upon observing danger within 7 feet at 15 miles
per hour and within 9 feet at 20 miles per hour.
Further than that, the physicist would have been
able to testify as to how far and how fast the child
,,~auld haYe bounced back away from the truck had she
run into the side of the truck at any given speed, and the
evidence "\vould conclusively show that if the child ran
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into the side of the truck at a speed of 4Y2 m.p.h. or greater, that she would have bounced back away from the bed
of the truck, and out of the line of the wheels, and that it
would have been absolutely impossible as a physical proposition for the child to be run over by the right wheel or
wheels of the truck and left her body laying approximately
parallel witb the road 18 ft. 5 in. from the south curb with
the truck following essentially a straight course prior to
impact.
This testimony of either the fastest speed of these 14
girls or the average speed was essential in the establishing
of this phase of the Plain tiffs' case. There are no charts or
reports or even expert testimony which could have provided the information. It was the most important, relevant and
n1aterial issue of the ease, and yet it was ruled out upon
defendant's objection on the grounds of materiality, which
ruling is reversible error. There may have been some argument that 14 students was not a representative number,
but the court held that it was representative but there is
no question as to materiality.
The courts have universally held that experimental
evidence is admissable if it substantially tends to establish
the fact that it is offered to prove. (Martin vs. Angel City
Baseball Assoc. 40 P 2 287.) Even though there is not a
known Utah case involving the identical fact situation,
the Supreme Court of this State has ruled in favor of experimental evidence in the case of Coon vs. Utah Construction Company, 228 P2 997. The case is an action for
damages to plaintiff's home allegedly consisting of enlargement of cracks in foundation and masonry walls from
excessive vicration caused by defendant's trucks operated
over highway adjacent to plaintiff's home, when defendant made tests to 1neasure vibration caused by trucks, the
evidence of the tests was admissable.
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In the case of Kling vs. City and County of Denver,
335 P2 876, police cars were driven over road where accident occurred at speeds above and below that of passenger
outomobile and it was held that any variations went to
the weight, not the admissability.
In a prosecution for homicide, in which one of the
points made by the prisoner is that he could not have
walked from his premises to the scene of the homicide in
tin1e to have fired the shot, a witness may testify to traversing the distance in a specified length of time, State vs.
Flyer 69 S.E. 269, Jones Commentary on Evidence, Vol. 2,
pp. 1382.
The experimental evidence in the instant case is not
objectionable on the grounds that two people are dissimilar in their speeds or actions, because the length of time
that it took these 14 representative girls of the age, size,
and grade in school as the decedent to walk or run a given
distance is neither speculative or uncertain. The jury can
then determine from other evidence in the case whether
the child walked or ran and which computation is applicable.
III.
ERROR OF' TRIAL COURT IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY PLAINTIFF
AS TO PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE ON THE PART
OF THE DECEDENT.
The truck driver defendant by his own testimony
stated that he was driving his heavy laden truck past this
elemenetary school house, at a time just before school
took up, at 8:45 a.m. That he was continually picking up
speed in front of the school to a maximum of 20 miles per
hour. That he was watching the children over in the
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school grounds, and did not see the decedent at all even
thongh she traveled a distance of at least 11 ft. 6 in. in
plain view of him in the street away from anything that
would in any way interfere with his vision of her. By any
standard of measurement, this conduct is below the care
exercised by the reasonably prudent person, and should
have justified a Plaintiff verdict.
But the plaintiffs' case was seriously prejudiced and
damaged by the court instructing the jury twice, (instructions 8 and 13) on contributory negligence, and then the
court committed the most serious error prejudicing the
plaintiffs' case in refusing to instruct the jury on the presumption of due care of the decedent at and prior to impact. Plaintiff phrased his requested instruction exactly
in the words of JIFU 16.8 which is the same asCF. BAJL,
135-A1. The Utah Supreme Court has on repeated occasions held that the decedent plaintiff is as a matter of
right entitled to such presumption, Tuttle vs. PIE 242 P2
764; Lewis vs. D&RGW Ry. Co., 123 P 97; Mecham vs.
Allen 262 P2 285.
Plaintiffs' requested Instruction No. 14 read as follows:
"You are instructed that based upon the commonly kno-vvn fact that the instinct for self preservaion is such that persons use ordinary and reasonable care for their own safety, the law permits you
to assume that Nila Hales, at the time of and immediately preceding the incident in question, was
exercising due care for her own safety. And you
may make findings inaccordance therewith unless
you are persuaded fro1n a pr@ponderance of the
evidence that she was guilty of contributory negligence, as elsewhere in these instructions defined."
The decedent, a 9 year old girl, under the circumstances~
of this case, crossing a street immediately in front of the
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school house at a time just as school was nearly ready to
begin, is generally entitled to an instruction requiring passing motorist to refrain from any conduct which n1ay injure
her requested in Pl. Instruction No. 8, 9, and 10 and if not
that instruction, most certainly the instruction on presumption of due care for self preservation. Inasmuch as the truck
driver or no other witness observed the conduct of the child
at or immediately prior to impact, unless it were the two
school children, David Weldon, who said the child walked
fro1n the opera house, south curb, to the school house, got
nearly to the middle of the road, hollered "help, help!" before the truck hit her with a front bumper, or the very uncertain testimony of Jerold Christensen who said he saw a
glimpse of Nila on the opposite side of the truck through
the small space between the cab and the bed, which condition is first impossible from the diagonal he was looking,
and second which testimony, if accepted, in its entirety in
the light 1nost favorable to defendant, does not add information as to her conduct at time of ilnpact as to negative due
care of decedent.
IV.
ERROR OF TRIAL COURT IN INSTRUCTING JURY
TWICE ON NEGLIGENCE, PROXIMATE CAUSE AND
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
In Paragraph B of the Court's instructions No. 8, the
Court states,
"Contributory negligence" is negligence on the
part of a person involved which cooperating with
the negligence of another, assists in proximately
causing his own injury. One who is guilty of contributory negligence may not recover from another for any injury suffered because if both parties
were at fault in negligently causing the injury, the
degree of negligence cannot be weighed by the
jury."
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In Instruction No. 13, the Court insrtucted as follows:
"Paragraph 3" That before you can find the
verdict for the plaintiff in this case, you must find
from a preponderance of evidence that the defendant, Paul Caldwell, was negligent, 2. that his negligence was the proximate cause of the injury, and
3. that there was no negligence on the part of Nila
Hales, which proximately contributed to her own
injury and death." In Instruction No. 5 giving instructions on burden of proof, the court recited
that it was the burden of the defendant to prove
that Nila Hales was contributorily negligent as
alleged in defendant's answer and that the negligence of Nila Hales, deceased, if any, would be imputed to her parents, the plaintiffs herein.
And then the Court again in their instruction No. 11
gave the following instructions:
"You are instru.cted that the mere fact that an
accident occurred is no evidence of negligence and
that the fact that this accident occurred is no indication that the defendants in this action were negligent. You are further instructed that accidents
are sometimes unavoidable and the law recognizes
unavoidable accidents, and in such cases lets the
loss rest upon whom it falls. Therefore if you find
from the evidence in this case that the accident referred to in the plaintiff's complaint was unavoidable so far as the defendants were concerned, then
your veTdict should be in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs, no cause of action."
With two instructions on contributory negligence, a
refusal to grant plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 14 on
presumption of due care, refusal to give plaintiffs' Instruction Nos. 8, 9, and 10, which outlines the care due a
child of tender years in front of a school and then to get a
further instruction on unavoidable accidents couched in
the language of Instruction No. 11, plaintiffs' case \vas so
prejudiced and the jury vvere so deluded with the respons·
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ibilities of contributory negligence of the decedent child
that it was impossible for plaintiffs' to have a fair trial.
In some cases, one instruction on contributory negligence is very proper and generally is a question of fact for
the jury, but in an action like the case at bar, it becomes
a question of law for the court. Where the established
facts and the circumstances permit only the one possible
conclusion, and where, as in this case, the record is lacking of any substantial evidence either direct or circumstantial, adduced either by the appellant or respondent
sufficient to establish contributory negligence on the part
of Nila Hales the court should not have left the rna tter of
contributory negligence to the jury. The Supreme Court
of Utah and other courts have ruled upon the impropriety
of leaving the question of contributory negligence to the
jury in such matters, even where the. presumption of due
care did not exist. Bennett vs. Deaton 68 P2, 895, and Bell
vs. Carlson 270 P2 420.

v.
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION ON
UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENTS
Although the matter of the instruction on unavoidable accidents is referred to in the argument on Point IV
above, to point out the cumulative effect of the several
adverse instructions prejudicing the plaintiffs' case, it is
desirable to point out the error of such instruction in this
case. There are some few instances where due to weather
conditions or an act of God or an extreme emergency, that
an instruction on unavoidable accident may be justified,
but in the present case, it is highly prejudicial. The defendant testified that he did not see the child, that he was
\vatching children over on the playground. He stated that
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he continuously accelerated his speed past the school
house to 20 miles per hour, and that when he felt the
truck run over something he stopped to determine what
it was. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the
accident resulted from any cause other than negligence.
There were no mechanical difficulties, no other persons
or vehicles contributing, no weather conditions affecting
the actions of either party. It is thus clear there was no
basis in the evidence for giving an instruction on unavoidable accident, and clearly such instruction resulted in
confusing and misleading the jury, prejudicing the plaintiffs' case and justifies a reversal. Such a reversal was
ordered in the similar case of Martz vs. Ruiz, 322 P 2, 981.
The case of Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co. 320 P. 2, 500, has
been quoted and followed frequently in recent decisions
in support of an instruction on unavoidable accident in
the language of the Instruction 11 in the instant case,
being a reversible error, and the Utah Supreme Court has
had cause, though in entirely different circumstances, to
comment on the Yellow Cab Co. case. The same rule is
established in the case and followed in Kelly vs. Hanwick,
153 So. 267, and which according to Trial & Tort Trends,
1958, pg. 131, has been followed in 90% of the cases as
grounds for reversible error states:
"The instruction is not only unnecessary, but is
also confusing. When the jurors are told that 'in
law we recognize what is termed an unavoidable
or inevitable accident,' they may get the impression that unavoidability is an issue to be decided,
and that if proved, it constitutes a separate ground
of nonliability of the defendant. Thus they may be
misled as to the proper 1nanner of determining
liability, that is, solely on the basis of negligence
and proximate causation."
The giving of the instruction further obviously over-
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emphasizes the defendant's case and suggests to the jury
that they should consider unavoidability as an issue or
ground of defense. An attempt by the jurors to carry out
such a direction would be expected to result in confusing
and misleading them, and the Courts generally hold that
the giving of the instruction under such circumstances
constitutes prejudicial error. There is no question but
what the plaintiffs' case, in this instant, was prejudiced by
the jury being permitted to believe that because the driver
had not seen the child, the accident was unavoidable.
Jurors are inclined to confuse unavoidability with
unintentional.
In Trial & Tort Trends, 1958, pg. 131, in commenting
upon the Butigan vs. Yellow Cab Co. case, it states:
"It is like proving the accident is caused by some
external cause which was brought in through the
situation that caused the injury. Over the last six
months, over the 48 states, there have been 40 or
50 cases, 9/10 of which resulted in a reversal when
at the request of the defendant, the Court instructed the jury on unavoidable accidents."
VI.
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF MISCONDUCT JUSTIFYING REVERSIBLE ERROR, AND
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAI~
TIFF NEW TRIAL WHEN DEF'ENDANT COUNSEL
STATED IN ARGUMENT TO JURY "INVESTIGATING
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS HAD NOT GIVEN ANY
CITATION TO THE DEFENDANT DRIVER FOR MISCONDUCT, AND . .l\.CCORDINGLY THEY HAD FOUND
THE DRIVER NOT NEGLIGENT."
It is a well known fact that law enforcement officers
including high,vay patrolmen, CouJJ.ty sheriff officers and
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city police, enjoy a special reputation especially among
the laymen, who are the usual group selected for juries.
It is the common belief of these people that because of
training and of the office that the officer is in a
special position to determine the negligence or nonnegligence of any act, and even the guilt or innocence for an act or omission. Great emphasis is placed by
the ordinary person upon the opinion of officers of the
law. And for that reason, the rules of evidence properly
excluded opinion evidence of an officer in determining
negligence. Perhaps the only person enjoying a higher
reputation and a greater respect among jurors for their
position to know and evaluate conduct as constituting
negligence or guilt is that of a District Judge, who the
jury serving public have learned will advise and interpret
the principle of law involved. Following the introduction
of the testimony in the instant case and the instructions
by the Court, counsel for each side gave their argument
to the jury. Former District Judge, Dillworth Woolley,
had been engaged as associate counsel by the defendants
in the trial of their case. He is extremely well known in
the area where court was held, and was frequently referred to during the course of the tritil as "Judge Woolley."
He made the closing argument to the jury and among
other things, stated,
"That the highway patrolmen and investigating officers in the case had not issued any arrest or citation for
wrongdoing in this case against the truck driver, and accordingly had found that he was not negligent."
Counsel for Plaintiff immediately arose and objected
and advised the Court that it was conduct and a statement
which constituted reversible error. The Court did not
direct the jury to disregard the statem~nt, nor did he advise them of the impropriety of such a state1nent. Notice-
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ably the presiding Judge vvas upset and shocked and
asked his former colleague not to pursue that matter
further. But the jury was left with the firm impression
from such statement that the driver had done nothing
\vrong. Certainly the former Judge knew he was going
beyond what was admissable or even proper practice, and
his enthusiasm and desire for his client's case no doubt
motivated him to stretch that practice which is permissa ble and approved under the standards of practice to misconduct; but in so doing, he seriously and prejudicially
affected the plaintiffs' case. The trial judge, on the motion for new trial, though recognizing the statement as improper and adverse to the plaintiff, did not order a new
trial. To state that this is not prejudicial and damaging to
the plaintiffs' case is to invite counsel in their exhuberance
to go beyond what is proper and acceepted practice and
to engage in impropriety and to that extent the other
litigant who came into court for a fair trail has had the
presentation of his case damaged and prejudiced.
,.,.

Because the reporter was out of the Court room at
the time the argument was made and the objection of
Plaintiffs' counsel presented to the court the presiding
Judge was requested and did write an affidavit which he
included in the record, vvhich describes the incident. The
page is numbered M-388, and reads as follows:
"This is to certify and affirm that I, Judge John
L. Sevy, Jr., presided at the trial of the aboveentitled case; that to the best of my recollection
on closing argument to the jury, defense counsel,
Dillworth Woolley stated that the highway patrolmen and investigating officers in the case had not
issued any arrest or citation in the case.
Plaintiff's counsel objected to the statement
and as Judge, I directed Defense Counsel not to
pursue the matter further. No request was made
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for a direction to the jury to disregard this statement and no such direction was given by the
Court."
This statement is given at the request of Eldon
A. Eliason, counsel for Plaintiffs as part of the
record on appeal.
Dated this 14th day of June, 1960.
s/ John L. Sevy, Jr.
District Judge
Subscribed and sworn to before me the 14th
day of June, 1960.
s/ C. Howard W artkin,
Notary Public.
Residing at Richfield, Utah
My Commission expires: 2/4/64"
lVfiscond uct of counsel in respect of their arguments
to the jury is discussed in Corpus Juris Second urn, Vol.
66, Section 36, in the following language:
"such misconduct of counsel in his remarks to the
jury may constitute grounds for a new trial, where
his argument refers to matters not in evidence."
In the instant case, the argument of counsel went
even further than referring to matters not in evidence
he referred to matters which he knew could not have been
introduced in evidence. In the case of Burbank vs. McIntyre, 27 Pac. 400, the court held in an automobile accident case that the trial court's general admonition to
the jury to disregard counsel's statement in striking out
the testimony showing arrest of the defendant for reckless driving, and the subsequent proceedings did not cure
the prejudicial effect of such staten1ent. And in the case
of Laughlin vs LaMar, 237 Pac. 2 1015, held that in a civil
action for personal injuries resulting from an automobile
colision it was' reversible error to all~w, over objection,
introduction in evidence of records in criminal action
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against the defendant predicated upon the same factual
situation in the absence of the proof of a plea of guilty to
the criminal charge. Of the same opinion is the case of
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. vs. Cloonan, 193 Pac. 2
();)() and Good1vin vs. Continental Casualty Co., 53 Pac. 2,
241.

VII.
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN NOT INSTRUCTING
JURY AS TO LAW GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF A
DRIVER IN FRONT OF A SCHOOL, WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS
8, 9, 10, WHICH WERE REFUSED.
The Defendant Paul Caldwell, in his testimony, testified that the speed limit in the area was 20 miles per hour,
and defense counsel in their argument to the Jury stressed
the fact that the driver wasn't, according to his testimony,
exceeding the speed limit. The only way to impress the
jury of the care required of a driver under such circulnstances, in front of the schoolhouse, driving a heavy laden
truck, \Vas for the court to instruct the jury on the extent
of the care and caution required of the driver. Such instructions were provided for the court in the requests
made by the Plaintiffs' counsel, 8-9-10 which read as
follo-vvs:
No. 8-"You are further instructed that if the
defendant driver of the loaded gravel truck, had
knowledge that minor children, at the time vvhen
the accident happened, were crossing the street on
their way to school, that he must take into account
that because of their tender age, they were incapable of foreseeing and understanding the dangers
of a heavy laden moving truck and that he must
further take into account the fact that children act
impul:;ively and swiftly and that the driver is requi~'ed to exercise care commensurate with the apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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parent danger and slight or momentary inattention
may constitute neiglgence where danger is close
at hand."
No. 9-"You are further instructed that the driver
of a loaded gravel truck operating in front of an
elementary schoolhouse at approximately 8:40 a.m.
is required to know the tendencies and impulsive
action of minor children. You are instructed that
if you find that he knew of the presence of the
children, that he is responsible for their safety, as
he approaches their school house and the pathway they use in going to school."
No. 10-"You are instructed that the defendant
driver claims he did not see the child, which was
run over and killerl. You are further instructed
that a driver of a heavy laden truck who has knowledge of the presence of children and who operates
it in front of the school at a time when children
are coming to school and using the street as a
pathway to the school house, may be responsible
for injury or death to a child even though he did
not see the injured child in time to prevent the
injury."
which instructions were denied and to which the Plaintiff
took exception.
In the California Court in the case of Lampton vs.
Davis Standard Bread Co., 191 Pac. 2-710, the court in
ruling on that matter stated:
"That the proximity of the place where Graham was driving to the adjacent school grounds,
and the hour at which children might with certainty be expected to be using the street, imposed upon
him a greater degree of caution than he might be
required to use under ordinary circumstances. That
which would be but ordinary negligence in reference to a grown person n1ay be gross negligence
as respects a child.''
In ConToy vs. Perez, 148 P 2, 680, the court said:
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"If the evidence -vvas that a driver had know ledge of
the presence of children, he may be held to have
been responsible for their safety, although it appears that he did not see the injured child in time
to prevent the injury."
The case of Frederickson vs. Costner, 221 P 2-1008
holds that if the driver knows of the presence of children
in the proximity of the vehicle, he may be held to be responsible for their safety. Of the same opinion is Brousseau
vs. Carnation Co., 290 P 2-588.

SUMMARY
In the summary of this case, several matters stand
out vvhich either considered alone or with all the circumstances of the case, establish the error which prevented
the Plaintiffs from having a fair trial. The appellate Court
should consider in this appeal both from the facts of the
case and the supporting cases forming a precedent that
not only the granting of a new trial is supported by the
Plaintiff's case, but a reversal of the decision with instructions for new trial on element of damages. The overvvheln1ing evidence of negligence on the part of Jhe defendant
driver, without any showing of contributory negligence
on the part of the minor child, and the minor child being
in the position of enjoying a presumption of due care,
would clearly justify the court in reversing the decision,
awarding judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the negligence of the defendant and requiring a further hearing
only upon the element of damages.
It is not uncommon for defendant in a wrongful death
case to admit liability and present to the court the case
only on the amount of damages.
The plaintiff in the summary in support of such proposition first calls the attention of the court to the testimony
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of Dr. Noys who stated in his opinion that the child's head,
groin, and legs were run over by the wheels of the truck
(Rl3). The testimony of David Willden, that the child was

hit with the front bumper after she had walked nearly to
the center of the road (R128), the testimony of the officers
that the body lay 18 ft. 5 in. in'to the street, where it had
been crushed, (R79), testimony of the defendant driver
that he drove his vehicle at an increasing rate of speed
past the school to 20 miles per hour on a course where the
right wheels were over the spot where the child's body
lay, (R146). That he did not see the child at all but felt
the bump when the right wheel passed over her, (R145).
T·he testimony of the officer that the defendant driver was
watching the children on the playgrounds, (R201). This
testimony is conclusive as to the negligence of the driver.
The child could not have injured herself in any way and
have been left lying parallel in the road, her head to the
east and her feet to the west, the truck having come from
the west, and the right wheels having run over her body.
The cases are not only overwhelmingly in favor of the
plaintiff in such cases where a child is injured by such
conduct of a motorist, but they are close to unanimous.
The case of Larsen vs. Jer01ne Cooperative Crea?nery, an
Idaho case, 283, P 2-1096, held in the wrongful death of
a 9 year old boy when he had been run over with a milk
truck which had backed over him, that in an action for
wrongful death, that where there were no eye witnesses
and no circumstances indicating clearly to the contrary,
that there is presumption that the person killed was at the
time of the accident in the exercise pf due care and caution
which, arising by reason of the natural instincts for self
preservation and known disposition to preserve and protect one's self fro1n personal injury. Such presumption is
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given the effect of prima facie evidence unless satisfactorily rebutted or a fact contrary to the conctusion is proved.
The Cotant vs. U. S. case (3 Federal Supplment 770) previously referred to, covers all questions raised in the instant case, and the instant case is much stronger in favor
of the plaintiff on every point. There is no escape from the
same ruling as that in the Cotant case.
Any one of the errors of the Court on Instructions, as
enumerated herein constitutes prejudice and justifies reversal: 1. The failure to instruct on the presumption of
due care, 2. two instructions on contributory negligence(8 & 13), 3. a further instruction on unavoidable accident,
and 4. failure to give plaintiffs' instructions, 8-9-&10 as to
care required in front of a school house.
To further prejudice the plaintiffs' case, the misconduct of counsel in arguing to the Jury that the law enforcement officers had not given any citation or found any
-vvrong in the defendant driver. In the case of Shatv vs.
Pacific Greyhound, 323 P 2, 391, the court holds that if a
challenged instruction was erroneous in any degree, even
if it is only fairly debatable, that such instruction may
have been misleading, and justifies a new trial.
The Utah Supreme Court has held in 9 Utah 5 - 336
P 2-781 Ivy vs. Richardson, that in determining -vvhether
a new trial was warranted, question was whether the case
\vas presented to the jury in such a manner that it was
reasonable to believe that there was a fair and impartial
analysis of the evidence, and a just verdict and if errors
vvere committed \vhich prevented that being done, then
a nevv trial should be gran ted whether it resulted from
one error or from several errors cumulatively.
The further case of Bo1.vden vs. D&RGRR-3 Utah 2nd
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444-286 P 2 240, has been that either the Court is convinced that the party to the action has not had a fair trial
because of court's failure to instruct properly, it is not
only the court's privilege, but solemn duty in the interest
of justice to grant a new trial.
The plaintiffs respectfully submit that the facts and
circumstances of this case require in the interest of justice
and fairness that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, as herein prayed.
Respectfully submitted,
ELDON A. ELIASON,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants
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